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COMMENTARY
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
Louis L. JAFFE*
The great movement for environmental control has reac-
tivated the long-standing controversy concerning the efficacy of
administration as the central organ for reform. I say "administra-
tion" rather than the "independent" administrative agency. There
has been a time when the argument centered on the independent
agency. But I am convinced that that form of the argument is
obsolete. The independent agency may add a dimension to the
controversy but it does not go to the heart of it, not at least, in the
debate as it runs today.'
It has been a truism now for some time-and it is as mislead-
ing and false as most truisms-that a regulatory agency is "cap-
tured" by the elements it is supposed to regulate. The proposition
appears to be not that it can be captured but that by its very nature
it will be captured. Of course, it can be captured and has been
captured. So too, have courts, legislatures and presidents. Arguably
what is meant is that an agency is more likely to be captured than
other organs of government. That no doubt is the contention of the
current proponents of the theory who, as is typical of Americans,
are completely innocent of history. They look to the courts for
salvation. They have either forgotten or have never known that
for many years it was gospel truth supported by a massive record
that the judiciary is inherently reactionary.
There is however evidence for the proposition that the corn:
parative degrees of liberal zeal of the various organs of government
is cyclical. There can be no doubt that in the last two or three
decades the judges have been in the vanguard of liberal innova-
tion. But even if it be granted that the agencies have been con-
servative or lethargic either because they have been captured or
for other reasons, nothing in our history teaches us that they cannot
0 Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard Law School. A.B., Johns Hopkins,
1925; LL.B., Harvard University, 1928, S.J.D., 1932.
1. Commissioner Elman has recently spoken out against the independent admin-
istrative agency with combined prosecuting and judging functions. He would transfer the
judging functions to courts and place the administrative (policy-making) functions in
single-headed administrations. I am not addressing myself here to that range of problems.
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once more be effective organs for reform, and much in our history
teaches us that they can be.
The capture theory is a reaction to the overvaluation of the
administrative agency by the lawyers of the New Deal. It was
argued by them that the administrative agency, particularly the
so-called "independent" version, would be a body of experts who
.would constitute an organ of continuous reform free from political
pressure. This pipe dream was just one more instance of American
optimism and superficiality. The enormous success of the National
Labor Relations Board in reforming labor relations and the similar
success of the Securities and Exchange Commission in reforming
the securities market enabled the proponents of the independent
agency to foster these illusions. They were correct, I believe, in
their estimate of the potential of the independent agency for
streamlined, high-powered action. But they did not realize that
the successful exploitation of the mechanism depends on a favor-
able parallelogram of forces. In the early New Deal days industry
and capital were momentarily discredited and on the defensive;
labor, and the investor in the ascendant.
The defect of the capture theory as a general theory is that it
is based on an essentially Marxian analysis of social forces. It
assumes that industry and finance run the country and call the
tunes. A quick inventory of the agencies and departmental bureaus
reveals the naivet6 of this assumption. The capture theory would
come much nearer the truth if it allowed for the variety of forces
which operate in a society so vast and complex as ours. The SEC,
for example, has a record of continuous innovation in investor
protection. It would be possible to attribute this to the power of
the investing public though there is no way to prove that proposi-
tion. Similarly the Labor Board has, for the most part, innovated
continuously over the years, but it has been more responsive to the
unions than to the employers. The Department of Agriculture is
notoriously partial to farmers. In other words an agency may in-
deed become unduly responsive to particular interests which how-
ever may or may not be "big business."
The Interstate Commerce Commission provides the ultimate
note of irony. The capture theory, in fact, was first propounded
on the supposed evidence that the ICC was dominated by the rail-
roads. Writing in rebuttal to this view some years ago, I think I
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was able to show that at the very time when the thesis was being
propounded the ICC was disabling the railroads from competing
effectively with the motor trucks.2 It has been following the same
line ever since. It might indeed be said that the railroad-dominated
ICC has led the railroads into bankruptcy. It might also be said
that the ICC represents no one in particular unless it be itself. It is
perhaps a "captive"-a captive of its obsolete theories, of its enorm-
ous and unwieldy technique, of its long and glorious past. It is like
one of Toynbee's fossil cultures living on because at bottom no
one knows what to do about the problems with which it is sup-
posed to deal. I hasten to add, however, that it has taken more than
the ICC to produce the present state of the railroads. There has
been a massive failure of our government to devise a positive and
coherent transportation policy. What can an agency do with a
legislature and an executive-or if you will a society-which is un-
able to develop a policy or is actively promoting policies of con-
fusion? The so-called failure of the agencies is only incidentally
their failure. It is the failure of the society itself and more par-
ticularly the dominant centers of government-the legislature and
the executive, the federal government and the states. In the 1950's
the Federal Communications Commission did indeed do a poor
job. But its performance in the last few years has been very re-
spectable and far more creditable than that of Congress which
has only passed the buck or put obstacles in the path of FCC
initiatives. The critics of the FCC have never been able to devise
a program acceptable to either Congress or the country. The FCC
has been a convenient scapegoat of their quixotic impotence.
And now we are faced with an environmental crisis. It is the
thesis of many environmentalists that the administrative agencies
and bureaus have failed and that we must look to the courts for
action. The theory of course is that the reason for the failure is the
power of industry, and that the courts alone can be trusted to cope
with that power. But industry's power is a function of all the other
sources of power in the country. That has already been proved as I
have noted by the record of the NLRB and the SEC. Until recently
there has been no organized pressure for environmental control..
The political situation has now changed radically. Every politician
2. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of -the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1954).
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is now sounding the call for pure air and pure water. The legisla-
,tive activity is tremendous. There are new mandates and new calls
to action. The stage is being set for the real battle to take place. It
would be self-defeating to assume that the administrative organs
annot be effective participants in the drama. It would be self-
dtefeating because there are many tasks which courts are not
*equipped to perform.
The due to the role of the agencies and bureaus is an analysis
"of the jobs to be done. Such an analysis will reveal that some of
e jobs can be bst performed by the courts and some by the
Agencies with the backing and guidance of the courts-and some
.y the legislature itself. The distribution of jobs will be deter-
'mined primarily by a correspondence of form to the task, but other
considerations will be important as well-prestige, for example,
where "clout" is needed. And, though I have attempted to deflate
or at least modulate the capture theory, we can still suppose that
'there will be situations where even though an agency may be in
form the best instrument it may in fact be too responsive to re-
actionary forces.
One way of approaching environmental problems is in terms
of simple problems and complex problems. The problem of dump-
.ng mercury into lakes and streams is simple-relatively at least.
'Mercury is a deadly poison, to fish in very small amounts and to
humans in larger amounts. Even here there are questions of "more
or less" but they are not too complex. On the other side of the
equation, to wit the cost of elimination, it appears that we are not
faced with staggering aggregates. The upshot? The Department
of Justice can bring a few quick criminal or equity proceedings
and-so it would seem-there is a very quick and effective response.
In such situations then, we must have available the direct and im-
mediate appeal to the courts with their prestige and high potential
for enforcement.
I At the other end of the scale is, for example, the problem of
controlling the general pollution of water systems serving densely
populated industrial and commercial areas. Once we have elim-
inated deadly. -pollutants (which may be by direct action in the
courts) we have then to deal with the great complex of pollutants
of an industrial and domestic character (sewage). A flowing stream
undeir iornomai conditi6ns carries a sufficient amount of dissolved
234'
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oxygen to break down and assimilate a given quantity of such
pollutants. Beyond that amount additional pollutants threaten
(depending on the amount involved) fish, birds, and swimmers.
Even here we do not deal with all or none. A given degree of pollu-
tion may destroy a certain percentage of anadromous fish (fish
ascending rivers to spawn); some pollution may do no damage. In
a given water system (e.g., the Delaware River Basin) various levels
of pollution will involve certain loss and gain effects in terms of
commerce and sports and-on the other side of the equation-
varying costs will be associated with the reduction of pollution to
levels regarded as desirable. It may not be worthwhile to spend an
additional $50,000,000 to save $5,000,000 worth of fish. Nor will
it be likely that the most economical method of treating the pollu-
tants would require each polluter (be it a city sewage system or an
industrial plant) completely to eliminate its own wastes. Thus, in-
junctions or nuisance actions against individual firms or polluters
may be costly and inefficient. What will be required is a process
which all the concerned communities under the auspices of an
administrative machinery develop acceptable standards in terms
of a cost-benefit analysis and devise a system of controls which is
the most economical. The Delaware River Basin Commission, an
interstate authority, has recently completed the initial process of
promulgating standards and is now engaged in implementing
them. It should not require much argument to demonstrate that
the judicial process is not well-suited to such a task.
Even when the task is primarily administrative the courts
have demonstrated that they can make significant contributions.
They have succeeded in opening up the administrative process
both at the hearing and the appellate stages to citizens and citizen
groups. This is indeed the single most important development in
recent administrative law. Either because they are unduly re-
sponsive to special interests or have become insulated from their
constituencies, the agencies in many cases do not adequately reflect
the interests of unrepresented or unorganized groups. Beginning
with the famous Scenic Hudson3 case the courts have begun to
guarantee standing to such interests both in the administrative
hearing and judicial review, and the opening once made the courts
have gone further and further in supporting their participation
3. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 854 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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And their initiatives. Scenic Hudson also interpreted the legislative
mandate of the Federal Power Commission to empower and re-
quire the Commission to consider conservation aspects of its li-
censing activities. This is an example of a significant judicial con-
tribution not only to the relevant procedure but to substantive
considerations. This has led some observers to hope that the courts
can exercise a major function in the actual decision making at least
to the point of building up a body of conservation "principles."'
This hope may be justified if we have in mind attitudes, burdens
of persuasion, etc., but I am afraid that the hard problems of "how
much to pay for what" can only be solved by the more political,
democratic processes of administration and legislation. The Su-
preme Court has recently, for example, refused to adjudicate
similar problems in the fields of education5 and welfare payments."'
There is beginning to evolve a type of general legislation
which would do two things: (a) establish the competence of
'citizens to bring original judicial actions as well as participate in
the administrative process, and (b) establish a kind of judicial
jurisdiction in which the court could itself adjudicate or could
call on the appropriate administrative bodies to participate. In one
version this legislation would allow a court to substitute its own
judgment for that of an administrative agency which had already
exercised its statutory jurisdiction. There is of course a question
whether such legislation is constitutional. Courts in the past have
refused to perform certain kinds of "administrative" tasks, par-
ticularly in the rule-making and licensing fields. It may be argued
that the nuisance jurisdiction of the courts is such a jurisdiction
and, indeed, many pollution problems can be treated as individual
nuisance problems even though, as we have indicated in connec-
tion with the treatment of a river basin, the problem should not
be so treated. Perhaps the courts can be trusted not to intervene
where they are not equipped to do so,7 although a few of our
judges are not notable for their self-restraint. Some of the environ-
4. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Ad-
ministrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612 passim (1970).
5. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
6. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
7. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970). The Court of Appeals did not believe that it was competent to deal with the
control of cement dust emissions in the Albany area and thus refused an injunction
though it did grant damages.
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mentalists are fanatical in their single-minded devotion to an
aboriginally-pure environment. It has been more than once noted
that many of them are well-to-do individuals who can easily pay
the cost of rigorous conservation standards In terms either of
initial outlay or the purchase of substitutes. The less well-situated
may not in the end be prepared to make the sacrifices required. We
are seeing now how difficult it is for the New York Consolidated
Edison to find ways of increasing its power supply in the face of
environmental protests. As delay accumulates so does cost and so
may the discomforts of those who depend on air-conditioning and
cannot retreat to their country places. There is a risk then of too
much opportunity for obstruction. I do not, however, think that
this is a serious problem. If the environmentalists overplay their
hand they will be checked. And all of us-the have-nots as well-
will probably have to learn the lesson that it is to our mutual ad-
vantage to protect the atmosphere even if it means reduced per
capita production. In working out the compromises that are in-
evitable the legislatures (state and federal), the administrations,
and the courts will all have important roles.

